Timor-leste : the harsh reality after independence by Kingsbury, Damien
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Kingsbury, Damien 2007, Timor-leste : the harsh reality after independence, in Southeast 
Asian affairs 2007, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp.363-377. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30006998 
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items 
included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by 
this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au 
 
Copyright : 2007, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2007 
TIMOR·LESTE 
The Harsh Reality 
After Independence 
Damien Kingsbury 
Even set against its long history of misery, 2006 was one of Timor-Leste's 
worst years. While there have been other years in which more people have 
died and in which its physical infrastructure has been more destroyed, 2006 
saw, if not the ending of a dream, then the harsh realization that the value 
of independence was only as good as its political community made it. In 
2006, Timor-Leste's political community tore itself apart, setting in train an 
internal conflict that had scope to run well beyond the year's end, and which 
threatened to relegate the country to the status of just another post-colonial 
failed state. 
Timor-Leste's descent into factional conflict and the related forced resigna-
tion of its Prime Minister retlected the type of political chaos that has affected 
many newly post-colonial states, in which competition for power overwhelmed 
a fragile and still fragmented political environment. So much had been hoped 
for and invested in Timor-Lesteby the international community, by the United 
Nations, and not least by the people of Timor-Leste themselves, yet so little was 
shown to have been achieved. 
Despite the change of prime minister, with the ascendance of the popular 
Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, the establishment of a UN police presence,' 
along with continuing external military support from some 3,000 foreign troops, 
violence and destruction continued, entrenching a regional divide that challenged 
Timor-Leste's future. 
DAMIEN KINGSBURY is Director. Masters of International and Community Development, 
School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University, Australia. 
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Before the Crisis 
Prior to the clisis, the state had been moving along at a steady, if slow, pace towards 
achieving a series of its development goals. Timor-Leste's most pressing issue was 
poverty. At around US$366 per capita GDP (corrected for purchase pricing parity)2 
Timor-Leste was the poorest country in the world, although with a slightly better 
Human Development Index ranking of 140 of 177 states. Such poverty underpinned 
and exacerbated all other social and political tensions. 3 
Against this backdrop, Timor-Leste's Fretilin government, led by Mari Alkatiri, 
had made several sound development decisions, in particular avoiding external debt, 
seeking local food security and bringing down int1ation.~ Alkatiri also led difficult 
negotiations against Australia for the best possible deal from the Timor Gap oil 
and gas field. The income from oil and gas receipts increased from US$649.8 
million in June to US$847.1 mll1ion in September' and was invested in intcrcst-
bearing US government bonds, returning 8.37 per cent in 2006. The economy had 
moved from negative to positive growth by 2005, if still at low levels and off a 
low base, education was developing and medical services had been considerably 
expanded, if somewhat controversially by importing Cuban doctors. 
However, the government of Timor-Leste also made some poor decisions.6 
According to the World Bank, corruption was becoming a problem.7 The govern-
ment's dismissal of these concerns, in particular in relation to the letting of 
government contracts to Alkatiri's brother to build roads and supply weapons, and 
the Interior Minister and close Alkathi ally, Rogerio Lobato, being involved in 
smuggling, alienated many Timor-Leste citizens and the international community, 
upon which the country still significantly relied. 
Despite destructive riots in late 2002 and the activities of quasi-criminal 
political organizations such as Committee for the Popular Defence of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL), Sagrada Famiglia, and Colimau 2000, the 
government had exercised considerable restraint by not proscribing them, although 
there was some persecution of Colimau 2000 members. However, the government 
and its institutions had been noted for a tendency towards authoritarian responses,s 
as well as incompetence in the face of serious challenges to state authorityY More 
importantly, the government also interpreted expressions of alternative perspectives 
as disloyal and potentially seditious. This lack of acceptance of legitimate dissent 
and a loyal opposition was perhaps its greatest political failure. lo By way of 
illustration, the opposition Democratic Patty head, Fernando de Araujo, and other 
party members reported hat'assment by individuals associated with then Interior 
Minister Rogerio Lobato, who was otherwise claimed to have established his 
own security apparatus I I and to have illegally armed non-state groups.12 Later, 
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De Araujo said a gang allegedly working for Alkatiri had threatened him with 
death,13 and his home was one of the first to be burned in the violence following 
the events of 28 April. 
This lack of tolerance and respect for the legitimacy of dissenting or alternative 
views, or the notion of a loyal opposition, which increasingly marked Alkatiri's 
relations with the Opposition, was also reflected in the poor relations between 
Alkatiri and President Xanana Gusmao. In 2002, Alkatiri said that he believed 
that Fretilin could win up to 90 per cent of the vote in the 2001 elections, while 
Gusmao said he preferred a vote closer to 50 per cent in order to create a viable 
opposition and hence a balanced democracy. This marked out the competing 
political styles of the two leaders. Gusmao campaigned for non-Fretilin candidates 
to provide a balance against Fretilin, creating further friction with Alkatiri. It 
also indicated that Alkatiri was more committed to Fretilin dominance than to 
successful plural politics. 
While the split between the President and the Prime Minister was most 
apparent from this time, it actually reflected a much deeper and older division 
within Timor-Leste's elite politics. In particular, during the early 1980s, the 
military wing of Fretilin under the leadership of Xanana: Gusmao modified its 
political position to become more inclusive and less traditionally Marxist. By 1984 
the party had split between hard-liners and "pragmatists" and in 1987 Gusmao 
formally separated Falintil from Fretilin, and made it the armed wing of a more 
widely encompassing resistance movement, the National Council of Maubere 
Resistance (CNRM). The ideological split of this time continued to be echoed 
in post-independence period, especially in 2006, and underpinned the friction 
between various political actors.!4 
Despite the warm embrace by the Timor-Leste people of electoral politics, the 
Fretilin government under the leadership of Alkatiri tended towards an "economic 
development first" model in which democratization was sacrificed on the altar of 
claimed material benefit, or at least state unity. It has been proposed!S that many 
earlier post-colonial states had abandoned democracy in the face of popular demands 
for economic improvement, set against a fractured and incoherent polity. In this 
approach, a confluence of ruling party and state was often evident. The claimed 
trade-off between economics and politics usually reflected more the particular 
ideological perspectives or corruption on the part of the ruling elite than it did 
any clear economic benefit. 
In the case of Fretilin, the party that had started with a Marxist wing in 
1975. had by 1999 embraced the free market as an economic principle. However, 
a group within Fretilin led by Alkatiri and therefore sometimes associated with 
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expatriates who had lived most of their exile in Mozambique, retained top-
down, highly centralized organizing principles often associated with bureaucratic 
authoritarianism. This was contrasted with a less dominant "reformation" faction 
within Fretilin, which unsuccessfully challenged Alkatiri for party leadership in 
April 2006. Along with an increasing tendency towards authoritarian responses 
to political dissent, with its limited tolerance of opposing political views, Timor-
Leste's government appeared to be sliding towards one-party status. Having begun 
its political life as a successful plural democracy, by the beginning of 2006 the 
state was heading towards a crisis. 
The Events of April-May 
There had been long-standing disquiet within Falintil-FDTL (Arn1ed Forces for 
the Liberation of Timor-Leste-Timor-Leste Defence Force) over a range of issues, 
including their status vis-a.-vis the police (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste-PNTL), 
general pay and conditions, a lack of clear purpose, and disenchantment with 
civilian politics. There were also divisions within Falintil-FDTL, primarily 
between members of the organization who had participated in the struggle for 
independence from Indonesia, and those who had since been recruited. Broadly 
defined, the older members were plimarily located in the east of the country, in 
Battalion II based in Bacau, while the newer recruits were largely located in the 
west, in Battalion I based in Metinaro near Dili. 
In February 2006, 591 soldiers from the Battallion I went on stlike after 
claiming grievances were being ignored by the government. Their grievances, 
outlined in a petition signed by 159 soldiers and sent to Gusmao as well as other 
leaders, centred on alleged discrimination, particularly concerning promotions and 
accommodation. 
After consultation between the Plime Minister, the Defence Minister, and 
the commander of Faltintil-FDTL, the government ordered the troops back to 
barracks. They refused and on 17 March were sacked for desertion. 16 While soldiers 
cannot ordinarily go on strike, the government sacking them appeared to be an 
ill-considered response to a potentially volatile situation, as noted by President 
Gusmao.17 The government's refusal to listen to the striking soldiers' grievances 
was consistent with ignoring other expressions of concern. The government's 
response was, at best, legalistic, at a time when it should have been sensitively 
political. In particular, Alkatiri could have called on President Gusmao to mediate 
the problem. But because of his antipathy towards the President over their diverging 
political orientation he did not do so. 
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Just days before it broke, there was little overt sign of the impending storm. 
The sacked soldiers then came to Dili, and on 28 April staged a protest that also 
included unemployed youths and members of the organization Colimau 2000. 
The protest quickly turned into a riot, the police were claimed to be unable to 
control it and at that point Alkatiri ordered in soldiers. They were ordered to 
shoot,18 which resulted in five deaths and a large number of wounded. There 
were claims, and some evidence, that rioters and others were shot while trying 
to flee. 
The "rebel" soldiers went into the nearby hills, along with thousands of 
others, including de Araujo and his family. "Loyalist" soldiers were sent to disarm 
one of the groups of sacked "rebel" soldiers on 23 May, 19 After ignoring requests 
from the rebel commander, Major Alfredo Reinado, to desist, they were fired 
on by the "rebel" troops and two soldiers and three others were killed. Fighting 
quickly descended into attacks in Dili, the arming of youth gangs, and attacks by 
"loyalist" soldiers against the police. Violence and destruction, primarily in DiH 
but also affecting regional centres, was increasingly located around a division 
between local gangs identifying themselves as deriving from the west of the 
country, as opposed to those who derived from the east.20 Up to 150,000 people 
were forced from their homes or fled them in fear,21 creating serious problems 
with food security and sanitation. As the wet season began towards the end of 
the year, 67,000 were still displaced, many without homes to return to.22 
Poor relations between the F-FDTL and the police, which descended into 
open violence at this time, stemmed from the poor human rights record of the 
police. Though cleared of wrong-doing, many of them had served as police under 
Indonesia and many also came from the west of Timor-Leste, enjoying higher pay 
and better conditions. In addition, some especially from the Border Patrol Unit 
(Unidade de Patrulhamento de Fronteira, or UPF) were corrupt.23 Soldiers had 
attacked the police headquarters and then, under a UN-brokered surrender, the 
police laid down their weapons and came out. They were then fired upon, with 
10 being killed and 27 wounded. In total, 37 people were killed in the violence 
of this period. 
After these events, there was widespread recognition that the United Nations 
had withdrawn from the country too much and too soon after helping establish 
the Timor-Leste state, as it was not yet sufficiently established and that it was 
consequently unable to deal with the issues that now arose. There was also 
significant criticism of Australia,24 and to a lesser extent the United States,25 
wanting to remove Alkatiri as prime minister. However, the greatest threat to 
Alkatiri's leadership had come from within his own party, which lost a motion 
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of no confidence in his leadership following a public show of hands26 that was 
later the subject of a legal dispute .. 
On 30 May, following media reports that the Interior Minister Rogerio 
Lobato and the Defence Minister Roque Rodrigues were arming unofficial 
groups, the two ministers were charged with related offences at Lobato was 
charged with arming an illegal gang. A television repOlt in Australia claimed 
evidence that Alkatiri had also been involved in arming illegal gangs, and on 
26 June he bowed to intense domestic and international pressure and resigned as 
Prime Minister. Fretilin put forward three names for alternative prime minister to 
President Gusmao, who chose his long-time ally, Foreign Minister and Alkatiri 
opponent, Jose Ramos-Horta as Timor-Leste's new Prime Minister. Following 
the split within Fretilin in the 1980s, Ramos-Horta had resigned as a member 
of the party, which made his appointment particularly bitter for many of the 
hard-liners remaining in Fretilin. 
After staying at a hill-top hotel in Maubisse, on 25 July Reinado and his 
supporters were arrested by Australian troops, but on 30 August he and 55 others 
staged a mass break -out from prison in the suburb of Becora. At the time of writing 
they were still at large and believed to be hiding in the west of the country. 
The subsequent UN report into the violence rooted its cause in high-level 
institutional failure, criminal acts by a number of leading figures, and at least a 
failure of decision-making by Gusmao and AlkatiriY The report found that President 
Xanana Gusmao made provocative statements during the crisis and should not have 
directly communicated with rebel troops. But despite some media allegations,28 
there was no evidence to support claims that he was directly implicated in the 
events. However, the report found that rebel leader Major Alfredo Reinado and his 
men committed criminal acts by killing two government soldiers and others. 
The UN report also found that then Prime Minister Alkatiri did not directly 
distribute weapons illegally to civilians, but had knowledge of the distribution 
and failed to stop it. The report also found that Alkatiri, in particular, bore 
responsibility for calling out troops to confront protesters on 28 April, which led 
to the fatal shooting of five protesters and the wounding of many others. However, 
the report also found that claims of 60 more being killed on the outskirts of Dili 
were unfounded. Senior figures were directly implicated in the distribution of 
weapons. Police Commander General Paulo Martins illegally distributed weapons 
within the police, while sacked Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato, Defence Minister 
Roque Rodrigues, and Defence Force Chief Taur Matan Ruak also illegally armed 
civilians. A number of charges against these individuals were recommended by 
the report. The UN findings provided further impetus to the International Crisis 
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Group (2006) report that recommended that Gusmao and Alkatiri retire from 
politics to allow a new, untainted, and hopefully more competent generation of 
political leaders to come through. 
Although gang violence and some destruction continued sporadically, 
there was an escalation of gang fighting in October 2006, with eight people 
being killed in the last week of the month in fighting between rival gangs. 
Dili airport was closed for 24 hours due to the violence just outside a refugee 
camp nearby.29 FDTL commander, General Taur Matan Ruak, who had been 
named by the United Nations as having illegally distributed guns to civilians, 
said the violence was politically motivated, aimed at destabilizing the Fretilin 
government and creating a "government of national unity"30 and called for the 
arn1Y to be released from the barracks to deal with the violence.:1! At the same 
time, there was a mounting campaign against Australian troops in Timor-Leste, 
with claims being made that they had taken sides in the conflict and calling 
on them to be put under the administration of a UN-led force. 32 This was 
strongly denied by the Australian Defence Force Chief33 and Prime Minister 
Ramos-Horta, who said that different gangs made such accusations against 
both Australian and Portuguese forces depending on which force had directly 
confronted which gang.34 
The violence that continued to destabilize Timor-Leste was based around a 
complex of issues and organizations that had begun to harden into distinct factions 
following the events of April-May. At one level, the violence was linked to martial 
arts clubs and quasi-political organizations. A report on the violence estimated that 
up to 70 per cent of Timor-Leste's men belonged to one of the clubs, including 
Dili's Setia Hati and Korka, which is aligned with Fretilin. According to the author 
of a report on the violence, "since the political crisis began six months ago, the 
gangs have become larger, more violent and their behaviour more disturbing"Y 
Particularly disturbing was the finding that some of these gangs were affiliated 
with leading political figures and had infiltrated the security forces, while others 
were based around quasi-political organizations, some with pro-Indonesia militia 
links or led by former resistance fighters, such as Colimau 2000, CPD-RDTL, 
Orsnaco, and Sagrada Famiglia.36 Other gangs were based on affiliation with 
mystical organizations, churches, youth associations, ethnicity, locality (bairo), 
and criminality. 
As Scambary has noted, Timor-Leste's grinding poverty, property disputes,37 
and turf Will'S over criminal activities directly contributed to gang violence, along 
with contentions over which groups most greatly contributed to the independence 
struggle.3s However, gang conflict also had historical antecedents, including 
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traditional rivalries over market access between Bunak-speaking people from the 
west and Makassae-speaking people from further east and around Portuguese39 
and later Indonesian-supported gangs.-IO 
looking Backward, looking Forward 
Despite Ramos-Horta's appointment as Prime Minister, gang violence and 
destruction continued in Timor-Leste, primarily in Dili. The United Nations 
and Australia argued about the organization and leadership of the international 
military presence, with Australia opposing a UN-led military mission. The 
rationale for this opposition was unclear, although Australia has not been 
favourably disposed towards the United Nations for wider political reasons. 
An international police, eventually under the auspices of the United Nations, 
meanwhile, took over almost all responsibility from the PNTL, which had 
functionally ceased to exist, ahead of that organization's restructuring and retraining. 
Joint UN-PNTL patrols resumed in November, but the police force remained 
weak and unstable. 
There was also a refocusing of international effort in Timor-Leste and at least 
in public some of its leaders recognized they had made mistakes. Ramos-Horta 
said: "If anything, we should blame ourselves for not being able to solve our own 
problems. "41 However, there was also reluctance by some to accept responsibility 
for events, and to blame others. In particular, Alkatiri claimed that the Catholic 
Church was behind the "conspiracy" to oust him, and that it had allied itself with 
"illegal groups" to do SO.42 Timor-Leste had not quite become a failed state, but 
it was starting to look as though successful statehood, even at modest levels, was 
much further away than anyone had imagined it might be, and that the extent 
of the task in restoring its previous, if inadequately supported, sense of security 
would take years rather than months. 
After Indonesian forces withdrew from Timor-Leste, the fledgling state had to 
begin to build from political fundamentals. These were only partially established 
by the time the United Nations began to wind down its presence in Timor-Leste 
in 2003, and the process of political development was still under way when the 
2006 crisis arose, demolishing faith in the existing polity and in their sense of 
nation. 
The most basic criterion for national unity is a common Janguage.13 The 
people of Timor-Leste developed their sense of unity in opposition to the occupying 
Indonesians through the common use of the Indonesian language. and the increasing 
use of Market Tetum (Tetum Praca) via church services.44 The government's 
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adoption of Tetum Praca as a national language helped unify the state. However, 
its adoption of Portuguese as Timor-Leste's official language was divisive.45 
Beyond language and other cultural markers, national unity was slowly being 
constructed around a recognition of and commitment to common civic values.4f> 
The people warmly embraced democratic voting, with more than 90 per cent 
voluntarily and consistently going to the polls. But the Fretilin government, which 
came to power with a 57.4 per cent majority (55 of 88 seats), was seen by many 
in Timor-Leste as being combative, distant, and largely unaccountable,47 even 
according to members of the party.4K There was as a result of police corruption 
and brutality - and allegations of pro-government thugs - an absence of a sense 
of rule of law.49 At the time of the May crisis, the idea of rule of law and notions 
of justice were still not well understood in Timor-Leste. Justice was often taken 
into the hands of aggrieved parties, who acted directly, while notions of revenge 
were also well entrenched. 
Beyond this, around half of the government cabinet members had spent some 
or most of their exile in Mozambique,50 which despite offering them sanctuary, 
education, and employment, retained a poor reputation for democratic practice (until 
1992 it was a one-party state, and was only a democracy in the most procedural 
of terms thereafter), respect for rule of law, or the separation of powers between 
the executive and the judiciary.51 Not surprisingly, the government itself stepped 
outside of legal bounds in asserting its political claims, especially in relation to 
the parliamentary opposition,S2 while the police have developed a reputation for 
unlawful brutality. 53 
As the crisis cased following the intervention of international troops and 
police, the constitution continued to be respected. Although Alkatiri claimed 
he was the victim of a "coup", his resignation and the appointment of a new 
cabinet was within constitutional guidelines and he had resigned voluntarily, 
if under great pressure. That Fretilin continued to dominate the cabinet, as the 
majority party in parliament, indicated that there had not in fact been a coup, 
but rather a conventional ("bourgeois") political accounting for the events of 
April-May. 54 
As a set of functional institutions, Timor-Leste's bureaucracy had been 
developing but, even under Indonesia, institutional capacity was poor55 and, despite 
the development of a post-1999 depleted workforce, remained at low levels.s6 
Capacity building remained a critical component of overall development,S7 and 
appeared to require continued international assistance. 
Two key state institutions that had clearly failed were the PNTL and the 
F-FDTL. The police failed primarily in employing torture, rape, excessive 
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detention, and other illegal methods against suspects and ordinary civilians.58 The 
F-FDTL failed both through the rebellion of soldiers from the west, and those 
"loyalists" who shot unarmed police on 25 May and armcd civilians. Since its 
creation on 1 February 2001, the F-FDTL has been a source of antagonism and 
muted threats against the government,59 growing tension including earlier attacks 
against the PNTL60 and the site of internal and inter-district disputes,6l culminating 
in the events of April-May 2006. 
As a consequence of these events, the PNTL effectively collapsed as an 
organization. Falintil-FDTL was too small to be effective against Timor-Leste's 
most probable aggressor, Indonesia, but too large to be affordable for the poor state. 
Falintil-FDTL consumed 8 per cent (around US$18.5 million) of the national budget 
(US$230 million in 2006). However, as prime minister, Ramos-Horta continued to 
endorse its existence. 
Beyond formal security institutions, there remained a significant legal and 
security threat arising from local gangs, self-defence groups, and the creation 
of politico-criminal organizations, notably based around former Falintil veterans 
including the above-noted Sagrada Familia, CPD-RDTL, Colimau 2000, and the 
isolados (individuals). Colimau 2000, CPD-RDTL, and Sagrada Familia also had 
links to former 1999 militia members, while Colimau 2000 members were also 
alleged to be involved in the violence and destruction in Dili in April 2006.62 
The motives of these groups remained ambiguous, with agendas that ranged 
from opposition to the state or state institutions to criminal activity, paramilitary 
organization, and even religious association.63 Even the governing pmty, Fretilin, 
seemed to believe that the party had a direct role in maintaining state order. 64 
Perhaps where the political society was weakest was in the social acceptance 
of political and legal institutions, their lack of "embeddedness",65 and in exchanging 
social or informal codes for formal codes. Timor-Leste has a parliamentary 
democracy, but there was little respect within it, or indeed outside, for the right 
to hold dissenting opinion (despite this being guaranteed by the constitution). 
Channels to accept the expression of grievances were required to be open and 
receptive in order to make such a process work. These channels were compromised 
by violence,66 at best difficult to access, often excessively formal and sometimes 
uncommunicative, for reasons of government arrogance, institutional weakness, 
and language barriers. 
As important as understanding and accepting ways in which grievances 
could be legitimately communicated, there was also a lack of not just tolerance 
of difference, including of language and region (overstated though the latter was), 
but also of political association and history. In particular, the people of Timor-
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Leste were notable for the capacity to know not just the political allegiance of a 
particular individual, but the allegiance of their parents and often grandparents, 
this lineage then being assumed to determine successive allegiances. 
Finally, from a history of social and communal violence, from before 
Portuguese colonialism to after Indonesia, the people of Timor-Leste had not yet 
learned that only official state institutions could legitimately employ violence. 
The corollary to this was that the state must be competent, behave lawfully and 
as benignly as possible, and itself only use violence legitimately, and only as a 
last resort. For the country to avoid becoming a failed state, it needed to achieve 
greater material development. But at least as importantly, Timor-Leste needed to 
further develop its sense of cohesive national identity and shared political purpose, 
and establish and embed the institutions which support such political purpose. At 
. the end of 2006, this remained a distant goal. 
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